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Examining the Determinants of Hotel Chain Expansion  
through International Franchising  
 
ABSTRACT 
This study proposes and tests an agency-based organizational model of 
internationalization through franchising in the hotel sector. Using data obtained from a 
Franchisor Questionnaire 2001-2008, we analyzed a panel of 117 observations of 17 U.S.-based 
hotels. Our analysis reveals that a hotel franchisor’s decision to internationalize through 
franchising is positively related to the percentage of franchises, the ratio of franchised units to the 
total number of units. The article contributes to the literature by empirically modeling 
international franchising of hotels, which present unique characteristics among franchising 
companies, with a high investment capital requirement, maturity in the product life cycle, and a 
high level of standardization and globalization of operations. The unique characteristics of 
individual chains and their segment in the industry are particularly important, as revealed by both 
data analysis and expert opinion.  
 
Key words: Franchising, internationalization, hotel industry, hospitality, Bayesian data analysis
 
 
  
  
2 
 
Examining the Determinants of Hotel Chain Expansion 
through International Franchising  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the U.S. economy the service sector has undergone tremendous growth in the past 
several decades, with the hospitality industry one of the major contributors to this fast-paced 
growth (Ketchen, Combs, and Upson, 2006). Unlike most other service sectors, the hotel industry 
is generally capital-intensive and its logistics and supply chain can be as complex as those in 
manufacturing operations (Chen and Dimou, 2005). For hotel companies, this can be a big 
obstacle to an equity-based expansion model in various markets, particularly in the international 
market. Thus, it raises the issue of the importance of the internationalization process through 
franchising as a non-equity-based expansion strategy.   
Franchising provides scope for rapid international expansion for hotel companies and has 
the potential to overcome many of the cultural, linguistic, technical, legal, and employment 
problems commonly associated with internationalization (Abell, 1990). Hotel chains prefer to 
use non-equity forms of organization for international expansion and operations mainly due to 
cost-efficiency concerns. Non-equity-based agreements, such as franchising, are the most 
common forms of organizational structure for market entry (Contractor and Kundu, 1998) among 
hotel and motel chains, partly because setting up a hotel requires a large amount of capital. In 
other words, the hotel and motel industry is capital-intensive, requiring a big financial up-front 
outlay to establish facilities. Franchising provides an opportunity for hotels to lower the risks and 
the level of investment to expand.  Franchising also allows hotel and motel franchisors to share 
the costs of expansion with the franchisees, who typically pay the start-up costs, initial fees, and 
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ongoing royalties. In return, the franchisees obtain brand-name recognition, economies of scale, 
and managerial expertise from the franchisors.  Contractor and Kundu (1998) propose that a 
competitive advantage can be derived by separating knowledge-based expertise from capital 
ownership.  A franchise is a way to transfer tangible and intangible expertise with limited capital 
risks. 
The hotel industry, in particular, is different among other service franchisors, justifying a 
separate examination.  Using chow tests to compare organizational determinants of 
internationalization, Alon (1999) found that hotels are significantly different from retail and 
business services franchises’ internationalization.  Franchising related costs are highest in terms 
of the required capital investment for hotels.  Total investment required by Choice Hotels 
International ranges from $2.3-14.6 million, InterContinental Hotels Group (IHG) $2-20 million, 
Motel 6, $1.9-2-3 million, and Hilton 53.4-90.1 million, to give a few examples.1  In contrast, 
most other service franchising industries require less than $1 million for start-up costs. The high 
capital requirement raises the risk of international investment and the needed bonding between 
franchisee and franchisor inherent in the agency relationship.  Hotels have decoupled the 
ownership of property from the ownership of intellectual assets and have extensively used non-
equity modes of entry internationally to defray expansion with minimum risk. 
 However, internationalization through franchising can be a complex process affected by 
many forces, particularly organizational factors and market conditions. Although previous 
research has examined factors contributing to internationalization through franchising as an entry 
mode in the manufacturing industry (e.g., Baker and Dant, 2008; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988) 
and among fast food and service franchisors (e.g., Ni and Alon, 2010), this study narrows the 
                                                          
1
 Retrieved from http://worldfranchising.com/industry/Lodging/ (June 2, 2011). 
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research gap by explaining the internationalization of franchising systems in the hotel industry by 
both empirically testing a theory-driven model and corroborating the model with in-depth 
interviews of industry practitioners.  In particular, this study attempts to identify and understand 
the impacts of organizational factors and market-condition variables on the decision of hotel 
companies to enter international markets through franchising within a framework of agency-
based theory.   
This study uses Burton and Cross’ (1995) definition of international franchising.  They 
define international franchising as “a foreign market entry mode that involves a relationship 
between the entrant (the franchisor) and a host country entity, in which the former transfers, 
under contract, a business package (or format), which it developed and owns, to the latter” (p. 
36).  This definition is suitable because our study does not differentiate between the various 
modes of international franchising.  It focuses on the decision to internationalize through 
franchising, regardless of the mode of entry.  In other words, franchising is a business 
relationship whereby a franchisor permits a franchisee to use its brand name, product, or business 
system in a specified and ongoing manner in return for a fee (Felstead, 1993). This method is 
commonly distinguished from other international market entry modes, such as leasing 
agreements or management contracts that are not included in the current study.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The internationalization of hotel and motel chains started in the 1950s and 1960s with 
firms such as Hilton, Sheraton, Holiday Inn, Marriott, and Ramada Inn. Modern-day hotel 
franchising as an internationalization strategy can be traced back to the 1950s when Holiday Inn 
established itself as the primary franchisor in the business (Shook and Shook, 1993). In the North 
American context, hotel companies relied largely on leasing arrangements and management 
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contracts as an internationalization strategy until the 1980s, when franchising was adopted as one 
of the mainstream means for international expansion. These methods reduced the investment 
risks associated with the internationalization of highly capital-intensive hotels and, in addition, 
allowed direct management control in countries with lower levels of management and staff 
expertise (Cho, 2004).   
Franchising systems in the hotel industry are among the most mature of the franchised 
services, therefore, they are further along the product life cycle. They also face stiffer domestic 
and global competition and declining profit margins, which together contribute to a greater 
awareness of the need to think of the world in global terms (Huszagh et al., 1992).  In fact, non-
equity organizational forms are becoming the norm among franchising systems across the hotel 
industry (Baker and Dant, 2008; Bradach, 1997; Perrigot, 2006).  That is, franchising hotel 
companies can use franchised outlets and various master and area development agreements at the 
same time in the same or different markets.  In recent years, multi-unit franchising has become a 
popular method to expand, particularly in international hotel markets (Altinay and Altinay, 2003; 
Cho, 2005).   
A review of the literature indicates that the growth of the hotel franchise sector through 
international franchising in various international markets is based on the following organizational 
and market-condition factors: (1) level of domestic saturation, (2) competition in the home 
market, (3) potential in emerging countries, in particular in Asia and Latin America, (4) regional 
trade agreements, such as the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
and (5) liberalization of the formerly Communist countries (Johnson and Vanetti, 2005; Kostecka, 
Benison, and Miller, 1988; Lashley and Morrison, 2000; Tucker and Sundberg, 1988).  American 
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hotel companies tend to use franchising as a business strategy to expand their brand (sometimes 
globally) in order to keeps risks to a minimum (Dunning, Pak and Beldona, 2007).   
Using the literature on the competitive theory of the firm, Huszagh et al. (1992) find that 
time in operation (age), number of units (size), and, to a lesser extent, equity capital and the 
location of headquarters are significant factors differentiating domestic from international 
franchisors.  Shane (1996) builds on Huszagh et al.’s research to concentrate on the agency costs 
associated with internationalization.  His findings reveal that the price structure of franchises, 
together with the monitoring capabilities, contribute to internationalization. Eroglu (1992) has 
developed a conceptual model of internationalization which uses organizational determinants, 
such as firm size, operating experience, as well as top management’s international orientation, 
tolerance of risk, and perception of competitive advantage.   
 Fladmoe-Lindquist (1996) build on the aforementioned research to develop a conceptual 
framework of international franchising based on resource-based and agency theories.  He does 
not test his model since it has a normative or managerial orientation.  But Alon and McKee 
(1999a) tested a model combining resource-based and agency variables in the professional 
business service industry and found only size to be a significant variable influencing franchisors’ 
decision to internationalize.  The number of outlets a franchisor has is among the most common 
predictors of internationalization.  Alon (1999) suggests that the effect of resources and 
monitoring skills (often measured as the number of outlets) on internationalization is common 
across industries, but its impact may be industry-specific.   
 The internationalization of hospitality firms and hotel chains is multi-dimensional.  Using 
a single embedded case study, Altinay (2007) shows that the internationalization of hospitality 
firms is often based on shareholder pressure, the desire to extend the core competencies of the 
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firm, and demand by international customers.  Contractor and Kundu (1998) suggest that 
reservation systems and hotel brands allow a franchise to thrive in foreign markets because they 
act as barriers against partner opportunism. 
 Much of the research on international franchising in the hotel sector focuses on 
explanations of modal choices.  Pine et al. (2000), for example, suggest that cultural distance 
between the host and the home market of the firm favors a non-equity mode of entry, such as 
franchising and management contracts. Hotels, particularly high-end hotels, generally prefer non-
equity-based modes of expansion, such as management contracts or franchising arrangements. 
The rationale behind this preference is not only because of the large financial outlays but also 
because of the inefficient use of land in the latter. In other words, the return on investment from 
their brand and management expertise is far higher than on land and buildings, and investments 
in the latter may create a drag on overall performance.   However, quality concerns may favor the 
use of owned properties (Contractor and Kundu, 1998).  Although the debate on the exact 
specification of  entry mode is ongoing, our focus here is on the decision of franchise hotels to go 
global through franchising within the framework of agency-based theory.   
 
Agency Theory and Price Bonding 
 Agency theory is a dominant paradigm to explain franchising, particularly in the United 
States (Baker and Dant, 2008).  The theory suggests that an agency relationship exists between a 
franchisor (the principal) and the franchisee (the agent).  Since the parties may have divergent 
goals, agency costs arise along with the risk of opportunism.  Principals can reduce agency costs 
and opportunism through direct observation and monitoring or through a system of aligned 
incentives (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).   
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 Rubin (1978) applied agency theory to explain franchising relationships. Franchising 
reduces monitoring needs by aligning the incentives of the agent (franchisee) and the principal 
(the franchisor) by making the franchisee a residual claimant on revenue.  Thus, in the hotel 
industry franchising is a substitute for direct observation when monitoring costs are high or when 
distance separates the principal from the agent (Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque, 1995; Norton, 
1988). However, hotel franchising has its own set of monitoring needs.  For example, intangible 
assets may be appropriated without monitoring, income can be misreported without auditing, and 
quality can deteriorate in the absence of controls. Monitoring skills are a key to successful 
franchising, especially if crossing borders, cultures, or marketing environments in which other 
direct control mechanisms are compromised.   
 Some agency explanations of the internationalization of franchising systems using agency 
theory were originally developed by Shane (1996).  To minimize agency costs, franchisors charge 
their international franchisees higher initial fees in relation to royalties, in comparison to what 
they charge their domestic counterparts.  This pricing structure creates high bonding between the 
franchisor and the international franchisee since the international franchisee has more at stake.  
The initial fee the franchisee pays constitutes about one-half of the total investment, often 
representing a major portion of the franchisee’s wealth.  The cost of termination is higher 
because the franchisee will lose the initial fee if he/she does not follow the strict format of the 
franchisor.  Therefore, it is hypothesized that  
H1: The greater the price bonding the hotel franchisor stipulates in its contracts, the 
more likely it will seek international franchisees. 
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Franchisor Geographical Dispersion and Franchisee Monitoring Skills 
 Opportunistic behavior by franchisees may also be controlled through effective 
monitoring (Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996).  Hotel franchisors’ monitoring skills are in increasing 
demand as they cross borders.  New risks are introduced by the changing environment, different 
factors for success, and the local socio-economic and political environments.  Because 
monitoring skills are not directly observable, in past research various proxies have been used.  
Shane (1996) finds that monitoring, measured as a multiplicative composite index consisting of 
the number of franchised units, the percentage of franchised outlets, and the age of the franchise 
system, is positively related to the internationalization of franchising.  Elango (2007) captures 
monitoring skills through the experiences of franchisors, namely, the percentage of franchised 
units and the number of years of the franchise.  Hotel franchisors that have franchised for a while 
and have achieved a high degree of franchise ownership in their system are also more likely to 
possess the monitoring skills required to succeed across heterogeneous locations.   
 Hotel franchisors with dispersed units are more likely to seek international franchisees 
since they are used to operating at arm’s length in distant locations, which are subject to slightly 
different conditions.  Franchisors with many franchisees in heterogeneous locations across the 
United States are better poised to take advantage of economies of scale in promotion and 
monitoring because such locations incorporate differing levels of return and risk (Huszagh et al., 
1992).   
 
H2a: The greater the domestic geographical scope of the hotel franchisor, the more likely 
it will seek international franchisees. 
Does Size Matter? The Scale Effect 
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Size matters in franchising (Alon, 1999).  It is oftentimes measured by the scale of 
operations or the number of outlets in the system. It is usually assumed that a hotel franchisor 
must reach a certain size before it can venture abroad. It must demonstrate that it is successful in 
a variety of local environments before it is ready to be tested in a global environment.  Scale 
infers financial capital, brand-name recognition, managerial and routine-processing know-how, 
and monitoring skills. It is risky to internationalize prematurely because international franchising 
systems in the hotel industry often incur huge expenses long before they receive any returns, even 
if the initial fee is low (Mendelsohn, 1996).   
 Fladmoe-Lindquist (1996) emphasizes the need for distance, and cultural and host 
country management skills for successful internationalization.  As the franchising hotel grows, it 
develops additional franchised units, which allow it to acquire resources necessary for overseas 
expansion.  As such, the franchising hotel’s scale (measured in terms of the number of domestic 
outlets) may be decisive.  If domestic opportunities are high and the franchisor has not saturated 
its market, then additional domestic franchises can be built and the opportunity cost of seeking 
more distant, risky locations may be less attractive.  In short, the number of outlets in the hotel 
franchisor’s domestic system should positively influence the franchisor’s decision to 
internationalize.  The larger the franchising hotel company, the greater the economies of scale 
(Huszagh et al., 1992), financial capital, brand-name recognition (Aydin and Kacker, 1990), 
market power (Huszagh et al., 1992), and market saturation (Shane, 1996).  The more outlets 
there are in the hotel franchisor’s system, the more likely it is that the franchisor can lower 
operating costs per outlet.  There are also economies of scale in purchasing, promotion, R&D, 
monitoring, and quality controls.  Some services, such as advertising, product development, and 
reservations, can be centralized, adding to the cost savings and to consistency in marketing.   
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 Finding international franchisees should also be easier for big hotel franchisors because 
of brand-name recognition (Aydin and Kacker, 1990).  The overseas expansion success of 
McDonald’s was partly a result of its highly recognized brand name.  McDonald’s has the second 
most recognized trade mark in the world, following only Coca-Cola (Fullerton et al., 2007). It is 
also easier for large hotel franchisors to raise capital in foreign markets due to their market power 
and perceived credibility (Huszagh et al., 1992).  In addition, there is a greater possibility that the 
bigger the franchisor, the more likely it will saturate the domestic market (Shane, 1996).  Thus, 
hotel international franchising can be seen as an avenue for growth due to limited opportunities 
in the home market.  From the above discussion we can postulate the following interrelated 
hypotheses tied to the ability of franchisors to monitor international franchisees.   
H2b, H2c: The bigger (number of outlets) and older the hotel franchisor, the more likely it 
will seek international franchisees. 
 
Franchising as a Strategic Model for Expansion 
 Franchising is an organizational competence that leads to competitive advantage.  
Franchising companies are able to leverage their know-how and reduce the resource commitment 
to maximize returns and minimize risks.  Ni and Alon (2010) found that fast-food franchisors 
that used more franchising in their system expansion were more likely to internationalize.  More 
specifically, those who sought international franchisees via multi-unit franchisees, sub-
franchisees or area franchises, were more likely to go global.   
 
 The expansion of franchisors into emerging and developing markets has also 
corresponded with the increased use of multi-unit franchising as a way to minimize risk and 
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expand rapidly at the same time.  The span of control is also smaller when multiple units report 
through a master or area franchisee, thus, making it simpler for the franchisor to manage multiple 
locations around the world, each with its own institutional environment.  Various forms of 
ownership and franchising have been well documented in the franchising and hotel management 
literature (e.g., Vianelli and Alon, 2007).   Garg and Rasheed (2006) suggest that (1) multi-unit 
franchising is growing in popularity in the international context where geographic and cultural 
distances exist, and that (2) agency theoretic explanations are especially well suited to explain 
this growth.  Multi-unit franchising is different from single-unit franchising in that the 
franchisees own, operate, and control more than one unit (Kaufmann and Dant, 1996).  There are 
several permutations of multi-unit franchising: (1) franchisors can allow area development 
agreements which give the franchisee a defined territory in which they can develop units, (2) 
franchisors can choose to use sub-franchising contracts (often called master franchising) that 
allow the franchisee to be both the agent to the franchisor and the principal to others (sub-
franchisees), and/or (3) franchisors can allow franchisees to establish additional units in a given 
territory (consecutive franchising). The use of multi-unit franchising has been shown to 
contribute to system growth (Kaufmann and Dant, 1996).   
 Multi-unit franchising reduces agency costs (including shirking, adverse selection, 
inefficient risk-bearing, free-riding, and quasi-rent appropriations) and promotes 
internationalization (Garg and Rasheed, 2006). First, shirking is reduced at the sub-system level 
because multi-unit franchisees detect cheating in their local contexts. They are able to compare 
same-store sales in a given geographical context and are delegated the monitoring needs of the 
franchisor.  Second, since a multi-unit franchisee, usually in charge of the area in which he/she 
resides, can collect more relevant local information.  Multi-unit franchisees can reduce the cost 
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of adverse selection because of their closeness, both geographic and cultural, to operations, 
recruiting, screening, training and monitoring.  Third, the flow of information is increased 
because multi-unit franchisees often reside in proximity to sub-franchisees. This geographical 
proximity contributes to knowledge of local market conditions and allows more and better 
monitoring so that appropriate and timely adjustments can be applied if necessary.  Fourth, 
inefficient risk bearing is reduced because multi-unit franchisees put a large sum of their  assets 
in the venture, and they are the owners of a more diversified portfolio spreading fixed costs 
against a greater number of outlets.  Fifth, since the brand-name capital is better captured over a 
greater number of units, the problems associated with free riding are minimized. Lastly, quasi-
rent appropriations are reduced because multi-unit franchisees can earn acceptable returns on 
investment in the chain.   
H3: The greater the proportion of franchising in the hotel franchisor’s system, the 
more likely it will seek international franchisees. 
H4: Hotel companies that use area development or sub-franchisees contracts to 
expand are more likely to seek international franchisees. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
This study employs Bayesian logistic regression analysis to examine the effect of the four 
hypotheses. Data were obtained from the Franchisor Questionnaire 2001-2008, Bond’s Franchise 
Guide. These data have been used by past researchers (e.g., Lafontaine, 1992). They are 
comparable to the data collected by Entrepreneur, but they are more detailed and extensive. 
Using 7 independent variables (listed in Table 1) to measure the constructs, we specified and 
tested an agency theoretic model of international franchising with 117 observations for 17 U.S.-
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based hotels chains (i.e., AmericInn, Best Inn, Candlewood, Country Inns, Doubletree, Embassy, 
Hampton, Hawthorn, Hilton, Hilton Garden, Homewood, Hospitality International, Microtel, 
Motel 6, Ramada, Red Roof, and Studio 6), where each chain has at least 5 observations. 
Logistical regression is used because the decision to internationalize is modeled as dichotomous 
(go/no go).  The binary dependent variable IE (international expansion) indicates whether the 
company is actively seeking franchisees overseas (beyond the United States and Canada). The 
dependent variable was conceptualized as in previous research on international franchising (Alon 
and McKee 1999a; Eroglu, 1992; Shane 1996). 
Table 1 summarizes the predictive variables and their definition and relationship to the 
hypotheses. In addition to the independent variables in Table 1, we also use the minimum total 
investment in million dollars (Invest) to take into account the capital-intensive nature of the 
industry.  Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics of the variables and the Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIF).  No serious multicollinearity issue is revealed with the largest VIF only being 
2.934. It should be recognized that one salient feature of the data is the longitudinal nature of the 
observations. We expect that the responses for the same company are correlated, which suggests 
a company-specific random effect for each of the 17 companies. A mixed model, sometimes 
called a hierarchical model, is well suited for analysis of longitudinal data (Pinheiro and Bates, 
2000). For example, Lafontaine and Shaw (1999) investigate the pattern of royalty rates using a 
mixed-effect linear model, with time as the only fixed-effect variable, and a company-specific 
random component. However, in this study, with a relatively moderate sample size of 117 data 
points, a traditional mixed-effect model encounters numerical problems. A Bayesian approach 
can resolve this issue (Carlin and Louis, 2000).  
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---- Insert Table 1 about here---- 
 
 
---- Insert Table 2 about here---- 
 
Let ijY be the binary response for the ith company’s jth observation, 17,...,1=i and 7. 
Define )1Pr( == ijij Yp .  The basic model is  
ijijijiijij XXXpp 7*...2*1*)]1/(log[ 8210 αααβα +++++=− , 
where 7,...1 XX denote eight independent variables in Table 1, iβ denote a company-specific 
effect addressing the correlation between multiple measurements for the same company.  
 
We assign the normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation σ as a weakly 
informative prior distribution for the coefficients. The scale parameter σ is fixed at 10 for the 
intercept 0α . For the other coefficients, we let the commonσ  be a value between 0.1 and 2.5.  
With varying σ  we are able to see the impact of the prior on the result.  For example, we may 
plot z-score , one of the common used statistics, for any coefficient against σ as in Figure 1 and 
2. The sign and magnitude of these z-scores can be interesting to readers, which provides a more 
complete and dynamic view of the influence of a particular factor than snap shots usually seen in 
the literature as in Table 3.  By default we use a Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) to obtain 
posterior distributions for the coefficients in a Bayesian data analysis; however, this approach 
may not be numerically stable, especially when the number of coefficients is relatively large. 
Most recently, Gelman et al. (2008) proposed incorporating an approximate EM algorithm into 
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the usual iteratively weighted least squares for fitting a logistic regression. This approach is able 
to directly estimate the posterior mode (the estimate of the coefficient) and its standard error, 
while it avoids the heavy MCMC machinery. In this study, we adopt the algorithm used by 
Gelman et al. (2008).  
Robustness of Empirical Outcomes 
Data triangulation was then used to enhance the credibility and external validity of the 
results of the quantitative data analysis. Triangulation is an approach to data analysis that 
synthesizes data from multiple sources (Creswell, 2009). Triangulation seeks to quickly examine 
existing data to strengthen interpretations and improve practical implications based on additional 
available evidence. By examining information collected by different methods, findings can be 
corroborated across data sources, reducing the impact of potential biases that can exist in a single 
data set. One approach of triangulation is to combine information from quantitative and 
qualitative studies by making use of expert judgment (Yin, 2003).  
Data triangulation was achieved in this study first by sharing the data analysis results with 
three industry executives and then by personal interviews to solicit their feedback and insights 
based on their professional experience. All three informants have vast work experience in the 
hotel industry and are knowledgeable about internationalization and franchising strategies and 
practices, both in the hotel industry in general and in the specific companies in which they work 
in particular. Informant A is Executive Vice President of Global Brands, Hilton Hotels 
Corporation. Informant B is Vice President of the Ritz Carlton Club, and Informant C is 
Executive Vice President of Portfolio Management and Administration for CNL Hotels & 
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Resorts. The interview results from the three informants have been integrated into the final 
section. 
 
RESULTS 
Figure 1 shows the curve of 7,...,2,1),ˆ(/ˆ =kse kk αα  with varying scale parameter σ , 
which can be used to assess the significance of the contributions from eight predictors. Figure 2 
shows the curve of 17,...,2,1),ˆ(/ˆ =kse kk ββ  with varying scale parameter σ , which can be used 
to assess the significance of 17 company-specific effects. The prior distribution becomes flatter 
with an increasingσ , i.e., the influence of prior distribution is diminishing. As σ goes to infinity, 
it converges stably to the classic logistic regression. Table 3 shows the result of the Bayesian 
logistic regression fit with 1=σ , which provides an informative snapshot of the relative 
importance of the variables as shown in Figure 1 and 2. The franchising experience and the 
percentage of franchised units are important at a 5% significance level. The higher the 
percentages, the more likely the company will seek international expansion. The number of U.S. 
operating units and multi-franchising indicator have only a marginal impact, with p-values 
around 0.10. All other predictors are deemed unimportant. 
Regarding the company-specific effects, only the 3 most interesting ones are listed in the 
Table, as suggested by Figure 2. Taking the other factors into account, Best Inn and Ramada are 
less enthusiastic about international franchising, whereas Candlewood is keen to invest overseas 
through franchising.  
Comparing our results with a similar study conducted on the fast food restaurant (Ni and 
Alon, 2010), we find several differences with the results obtained here from the lodging sector.  
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In the fast food, the price of the franchise fee in relation to the franchise royalties was positive 
and significant.  This is hypothesized because such pricing deters opportunism by raising the 
costs of a break up.  In our sample of hotels, the franchise price to royalty ratio is not a good 
predictor.  This is possibly because the start –up costs are high and, in effect, may serve as a 
bonding agent by raising the costs of exit.  Also in the fast food industry, the use of area 
franchising and, more so, sub-franchising also contributed to the internationalization of the 
industry (Ni and Alon, 2010).  In the hotel industry, multi-unit franchising does not contribute to 
internationalization possibly because the number of outlets needed in a region is smaller for 
hotels than fast food, or, said another way, the given territory per franchisee can be larger.  What 
is consistent between hotels and fast food is that both have a strong positive relationship to 
franchising percentage. That is, franchisors using franchising domestically are more adapt to 
using it internationally for expansion.  Franchising is a resource-based capability that can lead to 
global competitiveness and expansion.   
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
Using the framework of agency theory, the current study proposes and tests an agency-
based organizational model of internationalization through franchising in the hotel sector. This 
study contributes to the extant literature on international franchising by examining empirically 
the hotel franchising sector. It also tests other agency theoretic hypotheses linking franchising to 
hotel internationalization. On the practical side, this work highlights franchising factors 
associated with hotel internationalization through franchising and provides practical guidance as 
to when to seek international hotel franchising. The results of the data analysis support some of 
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the proposed hypotheses; more importantly, several findings are especially interesting and 
intriguing.  These will be highlighted in the following section. 
The study results indicate that franchise experience and the franchise percentage are 
positively related to a hotel franchisor’s decision to internationalize. By and large, this is 
consistent with previous research which reveals that a lack of franchising experience leads to 
high organizational uncertainty, making the monitoring of performance both challenging and 
costly, and thus hampering the internationalization endeavor. This international experience is 
especially important for hotel companies since franchising in the hotel sector presupposes a 
heavy investment in sunk costs in the process of developing the franchise package. It is also 
possible that a hotel company with limited international experience may find it more difficult to 
attract and select qualified franchisees. This finding was observed and supported by Informant B 
stated that without an established franchising base, international franchising may present 
incremental hurdles in comparison to domestic franchising. In contrast, with an established 
domestic franchise base, the challenges of international franchising may be diluted.  
Related to the positive impact of franchise experience, past studies have suggested that 
hotel franchisors with strong franchising monitoring skills are more likely to seek international 
franchisees. Informants B and C both pointed out that although franchising can be a strategy for 
expansion at specific times for hotel companies possessing high monitoring skills, the “high 
degree of franchising” may be more reflective of the brand strength, the company’s strategy, and 
the hotel operator’s needs at the time than the monitoring skills. Often times, franchising is a way 
to expand the brand in areas where it has not been able to expand on its own. Citing Marriott as 
an example, Informant B stated that he did not believe that the arm’s-length relationship and 
slightly different locations were the drivers as much as the specific locations of the company’s 
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expansion.  For example, Marriott’s expansion plan has been to establish the brand in gateway 
cities and then to expand beyond based on market feasibility, be it through franchising or 
ownership. In Europe, due to its relatively low brand recognition, Marriott has not used 
franchising as an expansion strategy; instead, it has acquired established international brands to 
achieve international growth and expansion. 
The results reveal that a hotel company’s decision to go international is negatively related 
to size (operationalized as the scale of U.S. operations), although it is not statistically significant 
with a p-value about 0.10, which contradicts mainstream research findings. Although a positive 
impact is expected for multi-unit franchising, little support is provided by the data analysis. 
In the hotel internationalization process, size is usually regarded as having a positive 
effect on franchising practices, mainly because large hotel companies have more resources to 
allocate to the franchising process and a higher resilience to failure should the system fail. 
Presumably, this may also have an impact on management risk perception in that larger hotel 
companies will experience less of an impact of financial risk, which is oftentimes reflected by the 
franchising cost. However, previous research findings on the relationship between firm size and 
the decision to expand is inconsistent, and sometimes even contradictory (Azevedo and Silva, 
2001). It may be the case that it is not the hotel size per se that determines whether to 
internationalize through franchising, but the characteristics of the particular transaction that will 
influence the decision. This has to be taken into consideration when different hotel market 
segments representing different levels of asset specificity expand internationally (Rodriguez, 
2002). As a result, hotel companies choose to use differing entry strategies when expanding to 
international markets.  
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For example, Chen and Dimou (2005) argue that services are usually more basic in 
budget and mid-scale hotels in comparison to upscale hotels. In this case, the services provided 
and the required skills from management and staff are limited and can be reduced to standard 
operating procedures and transferred to a third party via a franchise package. However, for high-
end luxury hotels, the provision of service requires highly skilled employees to guarantee the 
level of service to meet brand expectations. In this process, the transfer of knowledge is more 
complicated since this type of knowledge cannot easily be translated into standard operating 
procedures. As argued by Valikangas and Lehtinen (1994), franchising is commonly associated 
with problems of accountability and control. As a result, it is less suited to services characterized 
by high degrees of intangibility and of consumer/producer interactions and it is more suited to 
generic services that evolve around a recognized brand name, a basic standard performance, and 
a wide network of service units. When it is translated into hotel internationalization, Dev, 
Erramilli and Agarwal (2002) observe that franchising is more popular in the economy or middle 
market, whereas management contracts are more popular in the luxury market. They argue that 
the trend to choose a management contract becomes stronger as the size of the hotel increases 
and quality competence becomes an important source of competitive advantage. However, when 
quality is not an important source of competitive advantage, management contracts are less 
preferred and the use of franchising is more likely as the hotel size increases. As a result, 
regardless of size, franchising is not a commonly sought after entry mode in upper hotel market 
segments, compared, for example, with management contracts.  
The decision can also be affected due to quality assurance and free-riding control. For 
example, high control modes of expansion are considered to be less risky with respect to quality 
depreciation. Furthermore, free riding is more likely to occur when the value of a brand name is 
  
22 
 
high, thus requiring higher degrees of control. Again, regardless of size, if they decide 
internationalize, higher quality brand hotels will be more likely to choose a highly controlled, 
highly integrated entry mode rather than a franchising arrangement. 
It was noted in the interviews with the three industry informants that in addition to all the 
factors identified in the model testing that affect a hotel company’s likelihood of going 
international, brand might play an important role in determining what strategies are adopted 
when internationalizing. Informant A cited Hilton Hotel Corporation’s franchising strategies with 
their economy brand Hampton Inns in international markets as an example. Although the brand 
(i.e., Hampton Inns) has more than 1,400 hotels and nearly 172,000 rooms under the Hilton 
brand umbrella, it is largely unknown outside of the United States. Hilton’s management decided 
to arm the economy brand (along with Doubletree and Embassy Suites) with full equity of the 
Hilton name itself, and renamed the Hampton brand “Hampton by Hilton” outside of the United 
States. He justified this strategy by commenting that “while all three brands are well known 
within the United States, the Hilton name – one of the most recognized in the hospitality industry 
worldwide – is far better known in Canada and Latin America, representing a supreme 
opportunity for Doubletree, Embassy Suites, and Hampton Inns to be better recognized in those 
areas by virtue of their Hilton affiliation.” As a result, they added “by Hilton” to certain brands 
that are rapidly expanding into new markets abroad. This strategy was adopted in their merger 
with Hilton International to enhance the goal of becoming the premier global hotel franchising 
company. These strategies will afford Hilton a good opportunity to further diversify its income 
with the internationalization of its highly successful portfolio of brands through franchising and a 
multi-unit area development agreement.       
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The three case studies – Ramada, Best Inn and Candlewood -- that departed from the 
empirical results deserve a closer examination.  While Candlewood showed a greater interest in 
international expansion via franchising, Best Inn and Ramada showed less willingness for such 
expansion.  Ramada, established in 1954, only started to franchise in 1990.  It has almost 900 
properties, but only about 7.9% of them are international and only in Canada, the closest 
culturally and geographically to the USA, where the company is based.  Ramada’s properties 
concentrate in California, Florida and Texas.  By developing a strong US-based strategy, Ramada 
was able to compete with other chains effectively in the North American market.   
Best Inn, on the other hand, has another set of competencies.  It specializes in the budget 
part of the market and has carved  niche among ethnic entrepreneurs as franchisees.  The low cost 
strategy developed by the company for American consumers and the franchisee recruitment 
strategy, suited for American conditions, has discouraged its management from pursuing riskier, 
more remote locations for expansion.  Candlewood, on the other hand, is part of the 
InterContinental Hotels Group and has the backing of a large conglomerate with massive 
experiences abroad.  IHG also owns Holiday Inn, Crown Plaza and InterContinental Hotels and 
Resorts, all of which, have strong international assets.  Sharing of knowledge and resources has 
helped propel Candlewood into the international marketplace.   
While this study uncovers some of the determining factors of internationalization of hotel 
franchising, it is not without limitations.  The study only focuses on key organizational variables 
in predicting hotel internationalization through franchising, and does not consider other factors 
that might create different dynamics in the process of international franchising, such as market- 
specific characteristics and other situational factors. It is easily conceivable that the franchising 
process is market-sensitive and as a result market characteristics play an important role in 
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affecting franchising operations. These factors may include, among others, the market segment, 
the degree of control, either by the hotel industry sector or by government policy, the risks and 
costs of entry, and similarities of cultural norms and business. In addition, other situational 
factors potentially will be important in affecting how hotel franchising is carried out in a certain 
market, such as the maturity and stability of the financial market of the host country, the level of 
technology infrastructure development in the market, and the overall economic and financial 
conditions in the target market. Although there is anecdotal evidence in a number of case studies 
in different markets (e.g., Vianelli and Alon, 2007), there are no systematic studies examining the 
impact of market-specific dynamics and other situational factors on international hotel 
franchising. Whereas this line of research draws heavily on two major theoretical underpinnings: 
transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1985) and agency theory (as adopted in this study), a more 
holistic approach using a wider theoretical spectrum, such as the eclectic model expounded by 
Dunning (1981) should be encouraged to integrate both internal and external perspectives to 
explain hotel internationalization. Efforts in this direction in future research will be both 
worthwhile and rewarding.  
From a theory development perspective, hotel internationalization research generally 
needs to move from normative descriptions and formulaic assessments to a more in-depth, 
internalized, and processed-oriented understanding. Although this study ventures into efforts to 
corroborate model testing results with in-depth industry experts interviews, additional work 
should be encouraged to discover richer market-specific factors in internationalization that 
challenge the assumptions that business is business and management is management whenever it 
occurs and wherever it is practiced (Boddewyn, 1999). Obviously, more internalized qualitative 
research will avoid the parochialism and determinism observed in quantitative studies. In 
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addition, joint efforts by researchers in different industrial sectors, particularly the service 
industry, will contribute to more comparative studies that will enhance our understanding of 
internationalization strategies across industries and will help shape and refine the agenda for 
future research in hotel internationalization. 
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Table 1:  The Hypotheses, Variables, and Definitions 
Hypothesis Variable Relation Definition 
H1 FRratio Positive the ratio of franchising fee over royalty rate  ($k/percentage). 
H2a Disper Positive the number of US states where the company has a presence.  
H2b Fexp Positive the number of years the company has been franchising.  
H2c USscale Positive the number of US units. 
H3 FranPer Positive the percentage of franchised units among total number of units.  
H4 Multi Positive The indicator 0, 1, or 2 whether area development agreements exists and 
additional outlets can be added in a given territory 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Variables in Data Analysis 
 min max mean Sd VIF 
IE 0.000 1.000 0.692 0.464 -- 
FRratio 83.300 2500.000 976.057  507.092 2.367 
Disper 11.000 50.000 36.598 9.476 2.260 
Fexp 3.000 41.000 15.248 8.249 1.795 
FranPer 0.054 1.000 0.739 0.328 1.494 
USscale 33.000 1382.000 331.624 327.876 2.247 
Multi 0.000 2.000 0.744 0.559 1.659 
Invest 0.200 33.000 5.901 7.132 2.934 
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Table 3.  Excerpt of Bayesian Logistic Regression Fitting with Standard Normal as the Prior 
 Coefficient Std. Error z value p-value 
Best Inn -2.078 0.740 -2.807 0.005 
Candlewood 1.411 0.775 1.822 0.069 
Ramada -1.287 0.806 -1.598 0.110 
FRratio 0.000143 0.000672 0.212 0.832 
Disper 0.000915 0.0366 0.025 0.980 
Fexp 0.0913 0.0435 2.100 0.0358 
FranPer 2.404 0.969 2.482 0.0131 
USscale -0.00151 0.00101 -1.490 0.136 
Multi 0.867 0.581 1.494 0.135 
Invest 0.0298 0.0535 0.558 0.577 
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Figure 1. The ratio of 7,...,2,1,ˆ =kkα over its standard error with varying prior scale parameter σ , where 
two horizontal dash lines indicate the 5% and 95% percentile of standard normal, and the vertical line with 
1=σ corresponds to Table 3. 
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Figure 2. The ratio of 17,...,2,1,ˆ =kkβ over its standard error with varying prior scale parameter σ  with 
two dash lines indicate the 5% and 95% percentile of standard normal, and the vertical line with 
1=σ corresponds to Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
